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Published by: Royal Irish Academy
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25516075
Accessed: 28/05/2014 15:31

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LEIBNIZ AND THE JACOBITE WAR: REPORTS AND REFLECTIONS ON THE
BATTLE OF THE BOYNE AND EVENTS IN IRELAND, 1689–91

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[Received 27 March 1990. Read 4 October 1990. Published 15 February 1991.]

ABSTRACT

Among the manuscript papers and letters of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) that are preserved chiefly at the Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek in Hanover and are being published by the Academy of Sciences in Berlin are a number of documents relating to the Jacobite War in Ireland of 1689–91. The intention of this paper is to direct attention to and discuss these items, consisting of a series of passages in Leibniz’s political and historical correspondence and a hitherto unnoticed eye-witness account of the Battle of the Boyne. The former, paraphrased in English, are incorporated in the text, whereas the latter is given in full translation. In presenting this material it is hoped to provide an insight into the interest of Leibniz, polyhistor and one of the greatest scholars of seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Europe, in Ireland and Irish civilisation.

Introduction

In the third volume of A new history of Ireland J. G. Simms has described the Jacobite War, ‘the war of the two kings’, as a major crisis in Irish history, a crisis that decided the balance of power in Ireland for over two centuries to come (Simms 1976, 487). But the war also coincided with and formed a part of a crisis in European history. Since the middle of the seventeenth century the Holy Roman Empire had suffered under the expansionist policy of the Turks in the east and south-east of Europe and that of France in the west. The successes of the imperial forces against the Turks in Hungary and in the Balkan states in 1686 and 1687 induced Louis XIV to start in 1688 the war of succession in the Palatinate in support of claims of his sister-in-law Elisabeth Charlotte there as well as of Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg, his desired candidate for the electorate and archbishopric of Cologne (see A, IV, 3, 73) (see list of abbreviations at end of paper). The French invasion of the Palatinate was followed by similar action against the Rhineland and the Netherlands. Thus the aggressive policy of Louis threatened not only the empire but also the Dutch republic and Spain, and William of

Orange emerged as a key figure in the anti-French front. The English revolution of 1688–9, the flight of James to France and his subsequent landing in Ireland meant that a further Irish front in the European war was opened up.

Leibniz probably had no intrinsic interest in Irish affairs and no intimate knowledge of Irish life and of its cultural, social and economic influences. Although, from about 1694 onwards, he developed an interest in the Irish language in the course of his comparative linguistic studies (see Poppe 1986), his interest in the Irish war of 1689–91 can be attributed to the fact that this was a sequel to the English revolution and that the balance of power in Europe depended on the outcome of the European war against France. It was thus the European dimension of the Irish war that attracted Leibniz’s attention in the first instance.

For the duchy of Brunswick-Lüneburg (commonly designated by the name of its capital, Hanover), in whose service Leibniz had been since 1676, the war also represented in a certain sense a crisis. Allied with William of Orange in the grand alliance of 1689, most of the forces of Hanover were by 1690 deployed on the Flemish front. In the period of the Nine Years’ War with France the fortunes of Brunswick-Lüneburg were, however, very much in the ascendant; the initial ambition was to attain the status of electorate and in this context the privy counsellor Leibniz was commissioned to write a history of the princely family of Guelphs, the ancestors of the Hanoverian dynasty. The ambition was realised in 1692 when Hanover was promoted as the ninth electorate of the empire. Following the English revolution we also find the first intimations of a further ambition of Hanover, namely the succession to the English and the associated thrones, which only came to pass in 1714 but which was at stake during the war of 1689–91.

It is no surprise, therefore, that Leibniz, in view of his official position as a senior civil servant of the house of Brunswick-Lüneburg, should have taken such an interest in the war in Ireland. In terms of his own interests the war also represented a crisis. Throughout the 1680s Leibniz had pursued with a measure of success a programme for the reunion of the Christian churches, and the English revolution, and the war in Ireland that ensued, proved a major complication for his plans. All of this, then, forms the background to Leibniz’s interest in the Irish war and the affairs of Ireland.

Reports on the English revolution in Leibniz’s correspondence

Leibniz, a Protestant, first came to Hanover in 1676 at the end of a four-year stay in Paris to serve the Catholic Duke Johann Friedrich as privy counsellor. Continuing in the service of Johann Friedrich’s brother and successor, the Protestant Duke Ernst August, Leibniz undertook between November 1687 and June 1690 a research tour in his capacity as historian and historiographer of the house of Brunswick-Lüneburg, visiting libraries and archives in southern Germany, Bohemia, Austria and Italy. His archival research programme on the origin and early history of the Guelphs also allowed meetings with scholars and state and ecclesiastical officials in the lands he visited, and he kept abreast of events in Europe through his extensive and expanding correspondence.

The period from May 1688 to February 1689 Leibniz spent in Vienna. In June he visited Christobal de Rojas y Spinola, the Catholic bishop of Wiener-Neustadt, with whom, since their first meeting in Hanover in 1679, he had been working out
ideas for the reunion of the Christian churches. Through the bishop he now gained access to ministers of the imperial court and eventually, in private audience, to Leopold I himself. He was given permission to use the imperial library, and by the autumn he enjoyed such favour at court that the willingness of the emperor to appoint him as imperial historiographer was reported (Müller and Krönert 1969, 90–2). In Vienna he also read the French declaration of war of 24 September [all single dates new style] against the empire, in which Louis XIV attempted to justify his invasion of the Palatinate. In response Leibniz wrote 'Réflexions sur la déclaration de guerre, que la France fait à l’Empire' (A, IV, 3, 72–90) for which he, borrowing from his own pamphlet of 1684 against Louis XIV, conceived the alternative and ironic title ‘Mars christianissimus’ (A, IV, 3, 94) for ‘Le roi trés-chrétien’. Louis’s declaration of war against the empire was followed in November by a similar action against the Dutch republic. The war of succession in the Palatinate and especially Louis’s brutal and violent attack on the Palatinate, the Rhineland and the Netherlands were to be henceforth a major theme in Leibniz’s writings and correspondence.

When the revolution in England took place he was kept informed of the events by his correspondents and he followed developments with interest. In a letter written on 4 November 1688 the Duchess Sophie in Hanover sent him news (A, I, 5, 286) of the recent departure of William of Orange with a force of fifty ships and of the impending invasion of England. She had also received a letter from James II which was reported to have been forwarded to Leopold I. Leibniz in turn, in a letter from Vienna to the duchess on 28 November, refers (A, I, 5, 305) to diplomatic efforts to arrange the mediation of the emperor between James and the United Provinces.

William’s expedition, having at first returned to port, eventually set off on 11 November, and on 18 November another correspondent writing from Hanover, J. C. Urbich, informed Leibniz (A, I, 5, 295) that it was thought William would land in Scotland and then blockade the Thames with a force of sixty vessels. Furthermore, he was told of the discontent of the Catholics in Hanover, who had organised public prayer for the welfare of James. News of William’s landing at Torbay on 5/15 November quickly spread to the Continent. H. J. von Blum, writing from Prague on 11 December, informs Leibniz (A, I, 5, 309) of intelligence from Holland that the nobility and people of England were divided in their support for William and that a civil war was imminent, a situation that was likely to be exploited by France. In another letter of 25 December von Blum tells him (A, I, 5, 321) of the still uncertain state of affairs in England. The desired alliance of England and Holland against France was still not achieved. On the other hand, all reports from England were in agreement that a parliament was generally desired and that James would be obliged to consent.

James left England for France on 23 December 1688/2 January 1689. At the end of December Leibniz prepared a memorandum on church reunion for submission to the emperor. However, it is not known whether this was passed on to Leopold I, nor was Leibniz directly involved in the diplomatic activity that led to the conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna in May 1689. Leibniz’s thought at the end of 1688 was, however, in full accord with the efforts for the establishment of an anti-French front that was to culminate in the following year in the grand alliance (Simms 1976, 485). At the time, news of James’s first flight on 11/21 December had already reached Vienna, but not that of his capture and eventual escape, and there were unconfirmed reports that he was dead. In this uncertain situation
Leibniz warns (A, I, 5, 333–9) against the growing power and influence of France. He feared that she would, by putting on the cloak of religion, be supported by a large part of the Catholic clergy and that the allies would be accordingly divided. Leibniz attempts to justify the English revolution. Although James had only desired, as it might appear, to place English Catholics on an equal footing with their Protestant countrymen, he had now been overthrown, perhaps even killed, through the intervention of a foreign power and with the support of Catholic potentates in Europe. But the Protestants had not acted out of hate against the Catholic religion, rather to safeguard their freedom. France, through aggression against her neighbours and the suppression of her Protestant subjects at home, had rendered necessary the action taken against James, in consequence of James’s uncompromising stand and of a secret agreement with France, his neighbours, the United Netherlands, had been forced to take action for their own security, that of the empire and of Europe.

Leibniz in this memorandum expressed the fear that certain Catholic princes might now be induced to adopt a policy of neutrality for the preservation of the Catholic religion. He wished that Protestant princes should take action to quieten emotions and avoid the madness of a religious war. He made two concrete suggestions. William of Orange should, in accordance with his previously declared intentions, attempt to dampen the anti-Catholic feelings of the English populace, and Catholics there should be accorded the same freedom that their co-religionists in Holland enjoyed. Although the means adopted by the Protestants to prevent the suppression of their religion had been justified, a punishment of English Catholics would not be. A general amnesty would be the best solution and would gain praise for William among Catholics and in the world at large. The second measure to be adopted to achieve greater toleration and win the respect of Catholics pertained more to the German Protestant electors, princes and rulers. Their goal should be the removal of misunderstandings and abuses and the establishment of a Christian understanding between the denominations. These plans for church reunion had, he maintained, hitherto received the support of the electors and princes of the empire and had been opposed only by the French and their sympathisers. Indeed, the continuation of these efforts had been welcomed by the emperor and other Catholic rulers, even by the papal court itself.

This is also the tenor of remarks in a letter written in January 1689 to G. von Windischgrätz (A, I, 5, 383), the prominent imperial adviser and diplomat, whom Leibniz had visited shortly before leaving Vienna. If the British king, instead of vehemently forcing the abolition of laws for the advantage of Catholics, had adopted the approach that was being followed by the bishop of Neustadt and that had, almost by a miracle, been approved by Rome and welcomed by Protestant theologians and princes, then the affairs of England would not have reached their present extremity. In summary, then, Leibniz’s interest in and assessment of the English revolution were closely connected with his own project for church reunification. When the revolution had its sequel in Ireland, Leibniz continued to follow and interpret events in the light of this favourite project.

**Reports on the war in Ireland in Leibniz’s correspondence**

From James’s landing at Kinsale in March 1689 until the conclusion of the Treaty of Limerick in October 1691 the interest of Europe was directed to Ireland and this is also reflected in Leibniz’s correspondence. The first news of Jacobite
resistance in Ireland to reach him was probably that in a letter of 11 February from J. A. Zachariae in Hanover (A, I, 5, 402f.). In Ireland, he was informed, there were troubles but a sufficient number of troops had been sent over and all should go well. Furthermore, it had been reported that James, his wife Mary and the prince of Wales wished to leave France for Modena, where Mary's brother reigned as duke. In fact in February 1689 James was preparing his expedition to Ireland, the one going to Modena being Leibniz himself. With a letter of recommendation from the bishop of Wiener-Neustadt for Cardinal Decio Azzolini in Rome (Müller and Krönert 1969, 95–9), Leibniz left Vienna about 11 February and arrived in Venice on 4 March. Continuing his journey early in April, he passed through Ferrara, Bologna and Loreto, arriving in Rome on 14 April where, except for a brief visit to Naples in May, he was to remain until the end of November.

In Rome he met and discoursed with a range of scholars in a variety of disciplines and continued his research programme at the Vatican library and in private collections. He also established contacts with the Roman curia and with the Jesuits, making the acquaintance of the missionary Claudio Filippo Grimaldi and the order's procurator-general, Giovanni Battista Tolomei. By the time of his Italian journey Leibniz was also becoming a European celebrity in mathematics and science. His best-known mathematical discovery—the differential and integral calculus—but also important results in other fields such as celestial mechanics were being published since 1684 in a series of papers in the Acta Eruditorum of Leipzig. In Rome he was admitted as a member of the Accademia Fisico-Matematica, for whose members he composed his Phoranomus, a work in which he attempted to reconcile the Copernican system with the doctrines of the Catholic Church.

Leibniz was in Rome when Pope Innocent XI, who had supported the moves for reconciliation of the Christian churches as well as the anti-French alliance, died on 12 August. He now came in contact also with a number of cardinals who came to Rome to attend the conclave. Following the election of Pope Alexander VIII on 16 October, he wrote a congratulatory poem and was subsequently offered the post of custodian of the Vatican collections. However, Leibniz found himself unable to accept the condition attached of conversion to Catholicism. Continuing his research tour, Leibniz left Rome about 21 November and, visiting Florence and Bologna along the way, arrived at Modena, the final destination of his Italian journey, in the last days of 1689. He was received in private audience by Francesco II and received the full support of this court for his historical research. It was in the course of this itinerary that Leibniz received news from his correspondents of the war in Ireland.

After William and Mary had been made joint monarchs by the English Convention in February 1689, the Duchess Sophie, who had previously been in correspondence with James, could now inform Leibniz from Hanover on 17 June 1689 (A, I, 5, 423) that she had received a letter from the new king. William had made clear that she would have every reason to take an interest in the affairs of England as one of her sons might in time succeed to the throne there, an early intimation of the succession of her son Georg Ludwig and of the house of Hanover in 1714. The first actual reference in Leibniz's correspondence to the war in Ireland came in a letter written on 12 August 1689 from J. A. Zachariae in Hanover (A, I, 5, 467). Like most of the reports on the English revolution and the Irish war, it gives general information that was not necessarily accurate on the political and military situation rather than a detailed account of specific military
operations. Thus there is no direct reference to the principal event of the war up to this point, the raising of the siege of Derry, and the information reaching Leibniz related in the first instance to the campaign of Friedrich von Schomberg which commenced in August 1689.

Zachariae informed him that the upper and lower houses of the English parliament were on bad terms and that the bishops were not well disposed towards the new king. In Scotland there was still open rebellion, and in Ireland both James and the Protestant forces had adopted dallying tactics; Count Heinrich Solms was on the way there with further support. The rival fleets were confronting each other near Brest but not risking an engagement.

The intelligence from Scotland was substantially correct—the Jacobite cause there having not yet collapsed—but, although Solms accompanied the Irish expedition (see Kazner 1789, 323), the Williamite force that landed in Bangor Bay in August 1689 was led by Marshal Schomberg. Further information on the situation reached Leibniz in a letter from P. Mendlein written in Venice on 22 October (A, I, 5, 476f.). In that week news had arrived that Marshal Schomberg was master of the situation in Ireland and that James and the comte d’Avaux, the French ambassador, were attempting to flee. Scotland had been subdued and William would soon be master of the three kingdoms; the French fleet had disarmed but the Dutch fleet was seeking an engagement before the winter.

On arriving in Modena, Leibniz informed O. Grote, prime minister in Hanover, on 30 December 1689 that although the Italians supported James they were in no doubt that the English revolution had prevented the invasion of Italy by the French (A, I, 5, 494). Leaving Modena on 2 February 1690, Leibniz now travelled through Parma and Ferrara to Venice, where he arrived on 11 February and where he was to remain until 24 or 25 March. Venice was the last station of his Italian journey and on 30 March he reached Innsbruck. His route back to Hanover was through Augsburg, Regensburg, Vienna, Prague and Dresden (Müller and Krönert 1969, 100–3). In Vienna he had further contact with the imperial court and with Rojas y Spinola before continuing his journey back to Hanover, where he arrived sometime during the first half of June 1690.

In the course of this itinerary from Italy to Hanover Leibniz continued to receive information on the Irish war. In a letter of the beginning of February from P. Mendlein in Venice he is informed (A, I, 5, 521) of reports from England that James was dead and that in Ireland there were deliberations to declare Louis regent for the infant prince of Wales. King William would go there with a force of 35,000 men. Leibniz himself comments on the situation in a letter from Venice, written on 23 March, to Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels (A, I, 5, 558). This prince, a convert to Catholicism, supported Leibniz’s project for the reunion of the Christian churches. Ireland, Leibniz writes, would to all appearances occupy William for some time. A very able and judicious Protestant theologian had told him that he would not wish to undertake a justification of all William had done and above all of his decision to accept the throne. For his own part, Leibniz would not like to enter on the legal aspects of the question. Half of Europe was obliged to support the interests of William. Leibniz also tells that all the forces of the house of Brunswick were deployed in the Netherlands and the duke he served, Ernst August, would go there at once if this would be of avail. Meanwhile the forces of the empire, of Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg and Hess should be in a position to achieve something on the Rhine (A, I, 5, 592).

The major engagements of the war in the summer of 1690 were the Battle of Fleurus in Flanders on 21 June/1 July, where the French, led by the duc de
Luxembourg, gained a pyrrhic victory over the Dutch and their allies under the duke of Waldeck, the naval battle off Beachy Head on 30 June/10 July, where the French defeated the combined English and Dutch fleets, and William's victory over James on 1/11 July at the River Boyne in Ireland. The first two of these events are commented on in a letter from the court historiographer in Modena, C. Marchesini, to Leibniz on 28 July. The letter also contains a reference to the Irish force under Justin MacCarthy, Viscount Mount-Cashel, sent to France in exchange for that sent by the French to Ireland: 'e vi si aggiunge Milord MonCassel con quelli di sua natione'. As regards the Irish front, news of the engagement on the Boyne had not yet reached Modena and Marchesini gives Leibniz an account of the situation that was most favourable to the Jacobite position (A, I, 5, 633f.). Things looked bright for James following the French victories at Fleurus and Beachy Head. His forces consisted of 40,000 good troops, well equipped with munitions and cannons and superior in cavalry to the enemy forces, who could only attack them after a long march and in narrow passes. The commanders of the king's forces, the earl of Tyrconnell and the comte de Lauzun, combined the prudence of Fabius and the courage of Marcellus against the Dutch Hannibal: 'i supremi comandanti de’ esso Re Tyrcnel, e Lauzon mettono di concerto in opera uno la prudenza di Fabio, l’altro l’ardire di Marcello contro l’Annibale Olandese'. In Scotland the cause of the legitimate king was in the ascendancy, for fear of which Schomberg had been constrained to reduce his forces. England had not been secured by the prince of Orange and many were abandoning his service. Parliament had not wanted to pass the bill in his favour and against the legitimate king. The French armada, numbering 160 sails and comprising 88 vessels, was in the English Channel with orders to engage the enemy and they would be able to occupy and blockade the mouth of the Thames, and a French fleet of forty to fifty ships would enter St George’s Channel to prevent the English sending support to the prince of Orange in Ireland.

By the time Leibniz received Marchesini's letter he probably knew the outcome of the Battle of the Boyne and the actual state of the Jacobite cause in its aftermath. The most important source of information on Leibniz's views on the Irish and European war is now his correspondence with Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels. The first comment following James's flight to France is to be found in a letter of 14 September to this prince (A, I, 6, 106). When William was slightly wounded on the eve of the battle, false reports of his death spread to France, which were at once the cause of celebrations. Leibniz expresses his surprise to the landgrave that the French should now be making such fun of and publicly disparaging James's flight; Leibniz thought this had come about because the French had at first been compelled to rejoice at the false reports of William's death and had now turned their anger against James himself. It had been reported further that James appeared happy and jovial, which was thought strange. Formerly his spirit and judgement had been much regarded but now one spoke deprecatorily of him.

With the raising of the siege of Limerick in early September, William suffered a reverse in Ireland. The effect of this and other events on the war against the French and the Turks is assessed by Leibniz in a further letter to the landgrave on 13 October (A, I, 6, 113). After the Battle of Fleurus the enemies had contented themselves with spoiling the designs of the allies. Nevertheless, they had been active in Savoy in order to intimidate the princes of Italy, and the Swiss had been held in control by the approach of the dauphin. In Ireland, Leibniz continues,
they had gained time by holding Limerick and had given the Turks a breathing space, and if they could not be driven out of Transylvania the conquests of the emperor would be endangered. In the midst of these events France had been in a position to be master of the seas, having defeated the combined naval powers of England and Holland, each of which might have been her superior. Leibniz’s comment, however, does not make clear that although the combined Anglo-Dutch fleet was considerably stronger than the French, the fleets taken separately would not have been so.

Following the capitulation of Cork to the duke of Marlborough early in October, Leibniz commented again in a further letter to the landgrave on 3 November (A, I, 6, 127). The taking of Cork was for Leibniz a significant event in as much as there were a number of important Irish noblemen there: ‘La prise de Korck est quelque chose, d’autant qu’il y a quantité des Seigneurs Irlandois’. It had been proposed to send the common prisoners to the American plantations, but that would very much embitter the Irish nation, expressly referred to by Leibniz, and would not be without danger, since these people might revolt: ‘mais cela aigriroit beaucoup la Nation Irlandoise, et mesme ne se feroit point sans danger, car ces gens pourroient se soulever’.

This report of the proposal to send Irish prisoners to the West Indies was not an isolated one; much the same thing was related by the duke of Württemberg-Neustadt to the Danish king, Christian V, on 3 October, just a few days before the surrender of Cork (Danaher and Simms 1962, 79). Concerning the Irish noblemen taken prisoner at Cork, the duke of Württemberg-Neustadt speaks of four ‘Milords’ (ibid., 152) and a Jacobite source names the principal figures who were sent to the Tower of London (Gilbert 1892, 120): the earl of Clancarty, the earl of Tyrone, the lord baron of Cahir and Colonel MacGillicuddy, the governor of Cork. Leibniz surely overestimated the importance of these Irish leaders captured at Cork, but not, however, the significance of the taking of the city before the end of the second year of the war.

In a letter of 26 November to the landgrave (A, I, 6, 131), Leibniz refers to a communication from the landgrave of 1 September in which the distress of a certain Jesuit, because the Catholic garrisons in Mainz and Munich had celebrated the victory of William over James in Ireland with the singing of Te Deum, is alluded to. Leibniz was convinced that the course adopted by James was more likely to jeopardise than to serve the advancement of the Catholic faith. France too had contributed to the ruin of the Jacobite cause as much as James himself by driving the Huguenots to the point of despair and by attacking the empire. In a letter of 10 (?) January 1691 to the landgrave, Leibniz tells that he had seen a letter from the Netherlands in which the jovial behaviour of the duke of Waldeck on entering Brussels after his defeat at Fleurus was reported (A, I, 6, 151f.). King James had behaved in the same manner on his arrival from Ireland. This had led to the conception of a kind of satire in which potentates were portrayed at their lodgings: James was accommodated at the ‘rue de la Harpe’ under the signboard of ‘Grand Louys’. This would appear to signify, Leibniz thought, that James was now to be regarded as king of Ireland rather than of England, for Ireland has the harp on her emblem: ‘Il semble qu’on a voulu dire par là, qu’on ce [sic] doit considerer maintenant comme Roy d’Irlande plus tost que d’Angleterre. Car l’Irlande a la Harpe dans ses armes’.

Writing again to the landgrave on 5 March 1691, Leibniz enters into the question of the legitimacy of William’s position as king. The landgrave had told
him of the difficulty that a Jesuit, Father Jobert, and other French and Italian Catholics had in recognising William as legitimate monarch (A, I, 6, 182). This did not surprise Leibniz, but he too considered that William had come to the throne more by the right of war than by succession or by popular election, for a succession had not in fact taken place and a people could not be accorded the right of deposing a king under circumstances like the present; but the prince of Orange, heir apparent at least in relation to his spouse, had the right to wage war on his father-in-law and to exploit the unfavourable disposition of the people, for it was permitted to take advantage of treasonable subjects, of one's enemies or of unjust revolts.

At the outset of the third year of the war Leibniz once again refers to the situation in Ireland. The Jacobites still held at this juncture all territory west of the Shannon, and in May the French general, the marquis de Saint-Ruth, landed at Limerick to become commander-in-chief of the Irish forces. In a letter to J. C. Limbach on 19 April 1691, Leibniz writes that the Irish were in the meanwhile pretty well beaten and that he hoped that the allies would soon also be superior to the French at sea (A, I, 6, 486). Of the siege of Athlone (1–10 July) by the Dutch general, baron von Ginkel, Leibniz was informed by another correspondent, J. Robethon, writing from Gembloox in Flanders on 16 July (A, I, 6, 567). It had been reported that the Williamite army had commenced the assault on the part of Athlone east of the Shannon, and had made a breach in the castle on the other side. It had even been announced that Saint-Ruth was preparing to abandon Ireland, taking the best soldiers with him to France, and he had for this reason maintained vessels at Limerick. The two fleets were facing each other and it was hoped to have revenge at sea, following which and the reduction of Ireland the king could have in Flanders more than 30,000 English.

There is no report in Leibniz’s correspondence on the decisive and bloodiest battle of the war, namely Ginkel’s victory on 12/22 July against the Jacobite army at Aughrim in County Galway when Saint-Ruth was killed. By the time Leibniz was writing from Brunswick to Landgrave Ernst on 12 September, Galway had surrendered to Ginkel and the second siege of Limerick had commenced. Leibniz tells that there were reports that Limerick had been taken, but he awaited confirmation (A, I, 7, 143). In a letter from Brunswick, likewise on 12 September, to another correspondent, C. von Weselow, Leibniz also refers to church celebrations there, with the singing of the Te Deum and the firing of cannon celebrating the surrender of Galway (A, I, 7, 361). With the signing of the Treaty of Limerick on 13 October 1691, the war in Ireland came to an end and Leibniz was informed within a fortnight. Thus a letter of 25 October from Landgrave Ernst to Leibniz opens with a reference to the success of the Williamite forces at Limerick: ‘Les heureux succès autant de Limmeric’ (LBr. F20, 1334). In a letter from Hanover to von Weselow written between 2 and 15 November, Leibniz remarks that, since the reduction of Ireland, affairs had gone fairly well for King William in England, but with all of that he had no great expectations for the allies unless greater efforts were made in Germany and in Spain (A, I, 7, 431).

The Treaty of Limerick allowed the remnants of the Jacobite army to go to France and, as is very well known, Irishmen were henceforth to serve in considerable numbers in the French forces. However, Irishmen also served under William and in the allied forces after the termination of the war in their own country. Evidence of this is found in a final remark concerning the Irish in Leibniz’s correspondence. This is in a letter to Leibniz from L. J. Sinold (called Schütz) in
Vienna on 3 April 1692 (A, I, 7, 647). For the war against the Turks and France the empire expected much from the house of Brunswick that Leibniz served. The bishop of Münster was sending 3500 men, the king of Denmark 3000, and Saxony perhaps some forces too. For the Hungarian front the elector of Brandenburg would send only 1800 auxiliaries. However, ‘On attend 3000 Irlandois, qui seroient fort bons’, Leibniz is informed.

The ‘complete account’ of the Battle of the Boyne among Leibniz’s manuscript papers

In contrast to the reports on the war found in Leibniz’s correspondence, the account of the Battle of the Boyne among his manuscript papers is a detailed report on military operations and the reading of it ought to be preceded by a summary account of established facts pertaining to the course of the battle and its aftermath. The battle fought on Tuesday 1/11 July 1690 is one of the most celebrated in Irish history and its course is well known from many sources (see e.g. Hayes-McCoy 1969; Beresford Ellis 1989). The Jacobite forces assembled at the Boyne consisted of about 25,000 men and included the 7000 French troops who came to Ireland in March 1690 under the comte de Lauzin. In March the Williamites had also received a foreign contingent hired in Denmark, consisting of 1000 horse and 6000 infantry under the command of the German duke of Würtemberg-Neustadt. They were further reinforced by English and Dutch regiments in May, and on 14/24 June William arrived with more at Carrickfergus and took over command from Marshal Schomberg. The force that confronted the Jacobites at the Boyne a week later consisted of 36,000 or more English, Dutch, German, Danish, Huguenot and Irish Protestant troops.

When William advanced to Dundalk the Jacobite forces fell back to the Boyne where they occupied the south bank along a loop in the river, the main concentration of their forces being in the centre at Donore–Oldbridge, their right at Drogheda and their left towards Slane–Rosnaree. Behind them lay the route to Dublin which passed through Duleek; at this point there was the only practicable crossing of the Nanny, a little river that runs parallel to the Boyne three miles to the south. William, having marched with his army by Ardee, reached the Boyne early on 10 July and encamped on the north side facing his adversary’s camp on the ridge at Donore. Viewing the enemy forces down by the river that afternoon, he was grazed on the shoulder by a ball from the Jacobite guns across the river but recovered quickly and continued his command. At a council of war that evening it was resolved to force the crossing of the river next morning in a combined frontal attack at Oldbridge and flanking movement in the direction of Slane. Early on the morning of 11 July a detachment of several thousand troops, led initially by Schomberg’s son Meinhard, Count Schomberg, marched in the direction of Slane and crossings were forced at fords between Rosnaree and Slane. James, realising that his left flank was threatened, detached the major part of his force in that direction and effectively countered the Williamite advance and secured the line of retreat to Duleek.

The main attack took place later in the morning at Oldbridge and along a stretch of the river between Oldbridge and Drybridge, a little distance west of Drogheda, where the Jacobites were heavily outnumbered. Count Solms and Marshal Friedrich von Schomberg commanded Dutch, Huguenot and English regiments; they were vigorously opposed by the Irish guards backed up by
Tyrconnell’s cavalry, and Marshal Schomberg himself was killed at Oldbridge. A little later a further column under the leadership of the duke of Württemberg crossed a short distance downstream, and sometime after noon William himself crossed at the lowest ford at Drybridge with the remainder of his cavalry, including Dutch, Danish, English and the Enniskillen Protestants. The Jacobite dragoons and cavalry resisted to the end, but the infantry were overcome by the overwhelming Williamite force and in the end they quit the field and retired southwards to Duleek. There both parts of James’s army were reunited and there was no effective pursuit by the Williamites beyond this point. The Jacobites lost much of their baggage and guns, and a thousand or more died in the battle. The French force took little part in the battle and their casualties were slight. On the Williamite side about four to five hundred were killed. After the defeat James went in haste to Dublin and left early on 12 July for Duncannon near Waterford, from where he boarded a ship for France. Lauzun, Tyrconnell, the duke of Berwick and the other Jacobite leaders retired with their forces to Limerick. The Battle of the Boyne was decisive for the outcome of the war. By forcing the crossing of the Boyne, William compelled James to take flight and the Jacobites to give up Dublin and to retire west of the Shannon.

The account of the battle and its aftermath, ‘Eine vollkommene Relation von der in Irlandt von hiesiger Ko. Mt am 1 hujus erhaltenen victorie wieder den konig Jacob auß einem Schreiben datirt im lager 6 Meilen dißent Dublin den 4 July 1690’ (LH 25, 1–2), among Leibniz’s manuscript papers, consists of three and a half folio pages mostly written in a scribe’s hand; only the end of the document is in Leibniz’s own hand. It is included here in English translation; a copy of the original German document, with a transcription by the author of this paper, has been deposited at the Library of the Royal Irish Academy. The names of persons and places, as well as the new style dates, are identified in the translation in square brackets.


On the 30 of last month [10 July] we left our camp at Athedeedee [Ardee] and at about 11 o’clock in the morning we caught sight of the enemy encampment that had been pitched very advantageously on the other side of the River Boyne. The river itself is neither wide nor strong; the ground, however, in many places is very boggy and the bank on both sides is high, with the result that it was not easy to cross; nevertheless there was a ford on the enemy’s left wing where the bank was not so high and where there were several houses occupied by the enemy’s dragoons. He [the enemy] also moved his troops in the direction of that place and not far from them he set up a battery of six artillery pieces with which he fired at our cavalry, especially the right wing; but did little damage except that one of the balls came over his majesty’s shoulder from behind and tore off a piece of his cloak and injured the skin of his shoulder-blade, which did not greatly inconvenience his majesty. Between 7 and 8 o’clock in the evening our artillery pieces arrived with which we at once began to fire and destroyed two of the enemy’s cannon; around 9 o’clock the right wing together with the infantry
brigades of [Charles] Trellani [Trelawney or Trelany], [Sir Henry] Bellasis [or Belasye] and [William] Stuart received orders to march at about 6 o’clock next morning up the river Slane to the bank on the enemy’s side was rather low. As soon as our right wing began to march, the enemy’s army also split up and moved over the hills that lay next to the place of his encampment to that place to where our right wing hurried. When we reached the river we found several thousand mounted troops and dragoons of the enemy in front of us; our side had brought artillery pieces with them and had begun to shoot with these when the mounted troops of the enemy at once abandoned the aforementioned position with the result that our forces crossed the river without resistance; immediately after this the enemy emerged from the hills and took up formation along these so that he stood much higher than we; he took up position in a line which he interspersed with cavalry; his left wing was covered by the river, for which reason he was able to spread out his right wing more. At first our right wing marched on command with the above-mentioned three infantry brigades in two lines but came up at once against the enemy and reinforced the front line with cavalry and moved steadily forward to control the field and to get the enemy between themselves and the river; meanwhile the king sent his Dutch guards on foot and some other battalions to force the crossing by King James’s left wing [sic] where the action was sharp and, right at the beginning, D. de Schomberg was shot; still they mastered the passage with little loss and drove the enemy back who had assumed battle positions in that very place and who made a pretty good effort to defend themselves; two squadrons of King James’s own regiment consisting of French reformed officers charged three times with great resolution and drove our Inniskilliners back, who were led on again by the king himself; the mounted regiment of D. de Schomberg was also forced to give way but was backed up by that of Chack [probably Maj.-Gen. Hartwig Ahne Schack]; at last the enemy left the field and moved over the hills to that place where our right wing had crossed and where a part of his own forces already stood; on arriving there he adopted a fairly strong formation in two lines. Our army thereupon was also reinforced at that place with several squadrons and moved more and more beyond that place in order to cut off the enemy from the passage to a little place called Duleck [Duleek]. His majesty too marched over the hills in order to encircle the enemy; but when the latter noticed this he withdrew nearer to the aforementioned place, at first in good order but when he saw that we were pursuing in great haste he started to run with the result that only our cavalry was able to fall upon the enemy’s left wing. He withdrew through the aforementioned place and across a little stream [the Nanny] to high ground where we ourselves had to halt until our army could come together again; as soon as we began to move again and to go after the enemy he once again started running in great haste so that our cavalry could really follow him; since, however, we often had to tarry because of the bad roads the enemy once again gained time to take up battle positions on a rise six miles from Daleck [Duleek]. Our cavalry soon followed and took up position on another rise opposite the enemy but could not attack them for want of infantry which, although they had marched hastily, arrived only at dusk and formed themselves into one body; at daybreak we could no longer see the enemy, who in this engagement lost his artillery consisting of thirteen cannons and all baggage. Of the rank and file the loss was not so great as about 16001 [1600] men were left behind on the field; the worst for the enemy, however, is that by this action his army was entirely dispersed; all the route was
covered with hand-guns that they had thrown away and every day deserters come over, in fact around 100 as far as Dublin. King James left Dublin on the morning of 2 of the month [12 July] at 3 o’clock with the duke of Barwick [Berwick], Lauzun, Tyrconnel and others for Waterford; his troops have commenced to reassemble, in particular the French who made the greatest effort to stay together. Yesterday we encamped six miles from Dublin [probably at Balbriggan] in which town there are no more hostile troops. The town of Drogheda surrendered yesterday on terms and the garrison marched out with their own baggage but without arms.[...

Dublin, the 8 [18] July 1690

On the 5 [15] of the month we left our camp on the other side of this town and have camped now two miles distant on this side [at Finglas]; on Sunday the 6 [16] the king had all the lanes in the town occupied by his Dutch guards [from here in Leibniz’s own hand] and came around himself and went to the Church [St Patrick’s]; on the same day he was proclaimed king in Ireland. On the 3 [13] the order was given in the town that nobody should inflict any harm on the papists. On the 6 [16] it was proclaimed that all Catholics should hand in their arms. Yesterday there was news that King James had put to sea on a small vessel. King James’s army consisted of 52 squadrons and 35 battalions; although he lost at the last engagement not more than 1500 men, they are totally dispersed and the Irish are returning to their homes. The French are still staying together and their strength is estimated at 5000. It is understood that they have withdrawn to Limerick; our army will soon follow them. To become master of that place will require time because it is surrounded by water and bog and, as is reported, can only be approached with artillery pieces with the greatest difficulty.

The ‘complete account’: annotation and explanation

The ‘complete account’ has been compared with other sources in order to confirm its authenticity, to find out the proper names of persons and places mentioned and, if possible, to establish the authorship and date of transcription of the document. Probably the most important Williamite accounts of the Battle of the Boyne and its aftermath are the well-known Impartial history of the affairs of Ireland during the two last years by George Story (1691, 68–98; 1693) and the History of the wars in Ireland by an officer in the royal army (Anon. 1690, 106–31). Other Williamite sources are the Histoire de la revolution d’Irlande, which has been attributed to Jean de la Brune (Anon. 1691b, 112–50), the account given in the Theatrum Europaeum (Anon. 1698, 1298–315) that includes a report dated ‘12 July from the camp at Duleek’ by William himself sent to the states general of Holland on 14 July (ibid., 1303f.), and the reports of the duke of Württemberg-Neustadt and others of the Danish force (Danaher and Simms 1962, 44–7).

The Jacobite accounts examined include the two celebrated works by Charles O’Kelly (O’Callaghan 1850, 46–59; Plunkett and Hogan 1894, 19–24) and the Jacobite narrative (Gilbert 1892, 97–106), as well as the accounts given in the Life of James the Second (Clarke 1816, 393–403) and in the memoirs of James’s natural son James FitzJames, the duke of Berwick (Berwick 1778, 45–50). In addition to these first-hand accounts other contemporary reports have been examined, including
those to be found in Gilbert Burnet’s *History of his own time* (Burnet 1833, IV, 90–3), Narcissus Luttrell’s *Brief historical relation of state affairs* (Luttrell 1857, 69–72), and the account given by Samuel Pufendorf, the historiographer at the time of the battle of the elector of Brandenburg in Berlin (Pufendorf 1784, 254–7).

Historians from the eighteenth to the twentieth century have followed these accounts but have also incorporated other manuscript sources such as the dispatches of the French, German and imperial ambassadors. The ‘complete account’ has therefore also been compared with accounts given in the works of Kazner (1789, I, 329–50), Dalrymple (1794, 105–66), Macaulay (1855, 615–49), Ranke (1866, 106–82), Klopp (1877, 137–52), Bagwell (1963, 287–308), Simms (1976, 478–508), Hayes-McCoy (1969, 214–37) and Berresford Ellis (1989). Hayes-McCoy (1969, 236f.) and Berresford Ellis (1989, 154–6) have based their accounts on a range of additional sources, including both eye-witness accounts and general works, and both these authors (Hayes-McCoy 1969, 217; Berresford Ellis 1989, 100f.) as well as Simms (1976, 496) have prepared maps outlining troop movements during the battle. Of these secondary sources, the works of German historians such as Ranke and Klopp have a particular relevance in that the authors have incorporated in their accounts the dispatches at the time of the battle of the ambassadors of Brandenburg-Prussia and of the empire, viz. Thomas Ernst von Danckelman and Johann Philipp Hoffman. Klopp, who is also known for his publication of the works of Leibniz, does not appear to have known the ‘complete account’, notice of the latter first appearing in the catalogue of Bodemann (1895, 249).

Comparison with this literature has confirmed the ‘complete account’ as an authentic document and almost all the details of the report are either confirmed or can be related to other reports. On some points of detail the ‘complete account’ does appear to give new information, but in general it must be considered as just one of a considerable number of similar reports that constitute primary source material for the history of the battle and the war.

A series of points from the ‘complete account’ need elaboration and annotation. The main report was written on 14 July at the Williamite camp six miles from Dublin, probably at Balbriggan (see Story 1691, 91), and the concluding part at Dublin after the camp had been moved to Finglas on 15 July. The injury suffered by William on the eve of the battle, the two-pronged attack by the Williamite army, the death of Marshal Schomberg, the flight of James, the capitulation of Drogheda and the entry of William into Dublin on Sunday 16 July 1690 are events mentioned in most if not all of the sources with which the ‘complete account’ has been compared. On the other hand, there are some points where our document gives more detailed information or is at variance with the other reports; thus the ‘complete account’ appears to be the only one to name all three infantry brigades, i.e. those of Trelawney, Bellasis and Stuart, ordered to march with the right wing of the Williamite army and to cross the river at or downstream from Slane. On this point the officer in the royal army (Anon. 1690, 118) mentions only Trelawney. The report William sent to Holland (Anon. 1698, 130f) and that given in the *Histoire de la revolution d’Irlande* (Anon. 1691b, 120f.) both record that on the evening before the battle the king ordered Count Schomberg with the right wing of the cavalry, two regiments of dragoons from the left wing and the infantry brigade of Trelawney with five small artillery pieces to march up the river early next morning. A letter sent on 15 July by the duke of Württemberg-Neustadt to
Christian V states simply that the count was detailed with the right wing of the cavalry and Trelawney’s brigade to make an attack four miles upstream (Danaher and Simms 1962, 42). Count Schomberg’s adjutant, St Felix, who liaised between him and William during the battle, refers in a letter on 12 July to Schomberg’s wife (Kazner 1789, II, 354) simply to two brigades of cavalry, four regiments of dragoons, five battalions and five artillery pieces. Thus the regiments of Bellasis and Stuart are not explicitly mentioned in any of the other principal reports on the battle. All three regiments are, however, listed by Story (1691, 96) among the English foot that appeared at the review taken at Finglas a week later.

The reports on the action at Slane–Rosnaree and that between Oldbridge and Drybridge in the ‘complete account’ are not contradicted by any of the other accounts but, as is inevitable, there are differences on points of detail. Thus Story explains the retreat of the Enniskilleners (Story 1691, 83) as a result of a wheeling action taken by William who had placed himself at their head. They wheeled after him and retreated over a hundred yards. Once the king had placed himself at the head of the advancing Dutch, the Enniskilleners realised their mistake and advanced again. A Danish report, on the other hand, states that the Enniskilleners were chased back by the enemy onto the Williamite cavalry and in the confusion and thick dust charged one another (Danaher and Simms 1962, 46). The Danish correspondence also enables the clarification of a further point: the regiment which backed up that of the duke of Schomberg is very probably that of [Maj.-Gen. Hartwig Ahne] Schack who is mentioned there; however, a Lieutenant [Hans Friedrich] Schack is also referred to, and it cannot be ruled out that he is the one intended (Danaher and Simms 1962, 157).

Lauzun’s French force took little part in the battle and their losses were slight. O’Kelly states that they did not lose six (O’Callaghan 1850, 56) or sixty men (Plunkett and Hogan 1894, 23). The ‘complete account’ refers to some French officers in James’s own regiment, a fact supported by other reports. The officer in the royal army (Anon. 1690, 122) says that when the Danish horse once gave way they were brought up again by William himself, who charged the enemy at the head of the horse; after some resistance these retired fighting, commanded by Lieutenant-General de la Hoquelle and Lieutenant-General Hamilton, Lauzun being with the body who made head against Count Schomberg. The duke of Berwick refers to two French casualties among the cavalry officers who fought at Oldbridge: the ‘chevalier de Vaudray’ and the ‘comte d’Hoquincourt’ (Berwick 1778, 49).

The pursuit of the Jacobites six miles beyond Duleek as outlined in the ‘complete account’ is also described by the officer in the royal army (Anon. 1690, 123), who says that the enemy retired about three miles beyond Duleek and posted themselves in a very advantageous place; the king followed with his horse and dragoons to attack them there but, as it was late in the evening, he decided not to engage his troops again but had them remain at arms all night. Story in his account (1691, 85) says that they pursued the enemy for at least three miles beyond Duleek but did not offer to attack them again because of the ground. The king returned with some of the horse to Duleek where the infantry encamped; the others remained at arms all night where they left off the pursuit. The duke of Berwick says ‘les enemis nous laisserent aller tranquilllement’, and he adds that the rearguard action was contested on the Jacobite side by the French regiment of [Conrad] Zurlauben, all the other French having taken the road to Cork and Kinsale (Berwick 1778, 47f.).
The ‘complete account’ records that the Jacobites lost their artillery, consisting of thirteen cannons, and all baggage, and that 1600 men were left behind on the battlefield, the Jacobite losses being not more than 1500 men. The Jacobite narrative (Gilbert 1892, 97) says that their train of artillery was not above eighteen small pieces, of which twelve belonged to the French brigade. Plunkett and Hogan, in an appendix to their edition of O’Kelly’s work (Plunkett and Hogan 1894, 114), say that William had at the Boyne at least fifty pieces of cannon, besides several mortars, while the Irish had but twelve pieces, of which six were ordered to the rear before the battle. Concerning the numbers of the dead, the Jacobite narrative (Gilbert 1892, 102f.) says that the loss on either side was not considerable; of the ‘loyalists’, i.e. the Jacobites, about five hundred men were slain, whereas of their enemies there were slain ‘about a thousand private men’. The duke of Berwick says that the Jacobite losses were only about 1000 men (Berwick 1778, 49). The report in the Theatrum Europæum says (Anon. 1698, 1302) that about 1500 men were left on the battlefield but that more were killed during the flight of the enemy. A Danish report says (Danaher and Simms 1962, 46) that the enemy did not leave more than a thousand dead on the field and they themselves had only about two hundred dead and wounded. The officer in the royal army (Anon. 1690, 129) says he was told that there were not above 1600 killed, on both sides. George Story for his part says (1691, 85) that on the Irish side there were killed between 1000 and 1500 men whereas ‘On our side were killed nigh four hundred’. Thus the figures given in the ‘complete account’ are compatible with the figures given in the other reports.

The data given at the end of the ‘complete account’ for the strength of the Jacobite army at the Boyne, viz. 52 squadrons and 35 battalions, also require comment. The most detailed breakdown of the forces of both armies is that given by Story (1691, 95–8). His data are based on a review of the Williamite army taken at Finglas on the 7/17 and 8/18 July 1690, a week after the battle, and on a list of the Jacobite army taken on 9/19 April 1690, almost three months before. The listing of the Jacobite army is given in numbers of regiments, troops and companies: 59 troops of horse or horse guards, 1 troop of grenadiers and 48 troops of dragoons (a total of 108 mounted troops), and for the infantry a total of 49 regiments of Irish and French. If we take the numbers of men in the troops and regiments given by Story, we can compute a total force of almost 50,000. However, as Story adds, a great many were left in garrison in Munster and the numbers at the Boyne were 25,000–27,000. Thus if the squadrons and the battalions of the ‘complete account’ correspond, as is probable, to the troops and regiments of Story’s list, then the figures given in this manuscript, i.e. 52 and 35, would appear to be of the correct order of magnitude. On the other hand, if we compute the total number of men in the 52 squadrons and 35 battalions on the basis of the numbers of men making up these units, according to Story’s list, then we arrive at a grand total of 30,000–35,000, which is undoubtedly too high.

As for the aftermath of the battle, William’s entry into Dublin on Sunday 16 July, where he attended a service at St Patrick’s Cathedral, is reported in virtually all accounts. However, his being proclaimed king in Ireland on that day cannot be verified on the basis of these reports. The order issued on 13 July forbidding hostile acts against Catholics is verified by at least one other report. In the Theatrum Europæum (Anon. 1698, 1307) it is reported that on 12 July groups of Protestants had been demanding weapons from Catholic citizens; however, at approximately 6 o’clock on the morning of 3/13 July, the bishop of Meath.
(Anthony Dopping), Dean William King and other prominent Protestants formed a committee at the castle and had a number of proclamations announced, with the beating of drums, to prevent disorder. The second proclamation referred to is probably the declaration of William and Mary pardoning the ‘common Irish’ and calling on them to return home and surrender their arms to the justices of the peace. The *Histoire de la revolution d’Irlande* includes this declaration, which is dated Finglas, 17 July 1690 (Anon. 1691b, 147–50). The officer in the royal army, on the other hand, who has also included the declaration, says that it was published at the Williamite camp at Cromlin on 9/19 July (Anon. 1690, 131).

**Authorship of the ‘complete account’ and conclusion**

Comparison with the various reports and the secondary literature on the Battle of the Boyne listed in the preceding section has produced no evidence of the ‘complete account’ having been derived from other reports or having been known to historians to date. It has therefore to be treated as a new or hitherto unknown source for the history of this battle, for whose authorship existing literature provides no indication. The other possible route to determine its authorship is through research on Leibniz’s manuscript papers and through the extensive literature on Leibniz’s work and thought. This approach also has provided no definite indication of the authorship or of the time of transcription by Leibniz. A combination of these approaches does, however, throw some light on the possible identity of the unknown author.

Leibniz obtained his information on events such as the Battle of the Boyne through an extensive network of private and diplomatic contacts throughout Europe. It therefore seemed worthwhile to try to establish whether Leibniz might have had contact, for example, with any of the ambassadors, such as Hoffman or Danckelman, who are known to have reported home on the Irish war. No references to these could, however, be found in Leibniz’s correspondence for the period in question (A, I, 5–7). When the manuscript papers and letters were catalogued at the end of the nineteenth century (Bodemann 1895, 249f.) the ‘complete account’ was brought together with some other items relating to William III under the chapter-heading ‘England’. These included a couple of letters from Samuel Chappuzeau (1625–1701), who had been tutor to William of Orange and who from about 1682 was in the service of the house of Brunswick-Lüneburg. Once again in this case no evidence could be found for the ‘complete account’ having been transmitted through Chappuzeau.

Another possibility is that the document was written by a member of the force that was hired to fight in Ireland by William’s envoy Robert Molesworth in Denmark in 1689 (Danaher and Simms 1962, 6f.). Although it is not possible to find a personal connection between Molesworth and Leibniz, it is worth noting that a few years later Leibniz prepared a detailed report (A, I, 10, 19–24) on Molesworth’s well-known book *An account of Denmark as it was in the year 1692*, published in London in 1694. The argument in favour of our author having been among the Danish force is the most convincing and requires some elaboration.

The ‘complete account’ was written by a German in the Williamite camp on 14 July 1690 and was completed at Dublin on 18 July. It is very likely, therefore, that the author was a German officer or soldier in the Williamite army. Among the Dutch infantry was the ‘Brandenburg regiment’, whose strength a week after the battle was 631 men (Story 1691, 96), and the report that William sent to the states.
general on 24 July (Anon. 1698, 1303) says that the German infantry was the first to cross the river at Oldbridge: ‘Die Teutsche Infanterie passirte am ersten biß in die Mitte’. However, most of the Germans who took part in the battle on William’s side were in the Danish force, whose numbers a week after the battle are given as 812 horse and 4581 foot (Story 1691, 96f.). This force, commanded by Ferdinand Wilhelm, duke of Württemberg-Neustadt, was composed of men of many nationalities, but the Germans had the strongest representation. Of the approximately 300 officers of the corps, about three-quarters are judged to have been Germans (Danaher and Simms 1962, 146).

Between the reports in the Danish correspondence and the ‘complete account’ there are a number of striking similarities. Thus we find similar statements like that telling of the death of Schomberg: in the ‘complete account’ we have that ‘the action was sharp and, right at the beginning, D. de Schomberg was killed’, and in a Danish report of unknown authorship ‘There was a very sharp fight there in which Marshal Schomberg was killed’ (Danaher and Simms 1962, 45). The incorrect statement that the duke of Berwick, the comte de Lauzun and Lord Tyrconnell had fled to Waterford with James is found in Danish reports (ibid., 46–8) too. The hundred deserters mentioned in the ‘complete account’ are likewise mentioned in the Danish correspondence, where we learn that these were mostly Germans who came over from the Zurlauben regiment. The most direct statement is in a letter of 19 July to King Christian V from the duke of Württemberg-Neustadt, who says of these deserters ‘About 100 have joined Your Majesty’s battalions’ (ibid., 46). The report that Irish prisoners-of-war would be sent to the American plantations, mentioned in Leibniz’s letter of 3 November 1690 to Landgrave Ernst (see A, I, 6, 127), is likewise referred to in a letter of the duke of Württemberg-Neustadt to Christian V on 3 October 1690 (Danaher and Simms 1962, 78). There is also a similarity in the language and style of reporting between the ‘complete account’ and a document sent by the duke of Württemberg to Christian V following the Battle of Aughrim a year later, entitled ‘A full account of the main engagement at Aghrim [sic] between the armies of King William and King James on Sunday 12 July last’ (Danaher and Simms 1962, 120–3).

The similarities with the Danish correspondence are striking and it is tempting to think that the duke of Württemberg might be the author of our ‘complete account’, but the evidence does not bear this out. Though the similarities are greatest with the Danish correspondence, there is also a series of points on which our document diverges in terms of content and of language from these reports. Furthermore, as our document is but a copy a comparison of the handwriting cannot help to decide the matter. And there is also no apparent link between the duke of Württemberg-Neustadt and Leibniz. The duke’s mother had been a princess of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel and a link with Leibniz might seem possible, but neither Ferdinand Wilhelm, our duke of Württemberg-Neustadt, his younger brother Karl Rudolf (see Europäische Stammtafeln 1965, 80) nor any of the Danes or Germans whose names are found in the Danish correspondence from Ireland appear in Leibniz’s correspondence at this time (A, I, 5–7), the only exception being King Christian V, who is frequently mentioned but who was not a correspondent of his. It appears, therefore, that if the document from which the ‘complete account’ was copied bore the name of its author at all, this name meant nothing to Leibniz or he chose not to note it.

In conclusion, two points that are primarily of interest for the edition of Leibniz’s manuscript papers need to be discussed. The first concerns the time of
transcription of the ‘complete account’ and the second the possible relation of the
document to other manuscript papers of Leibniz. The date of transcription is not
known but it was probably not long after the Battle of the Boyne, perhaps in the
second half of 1690. News of the outcome of the battle was rapidly transmitted
throughout Europe. Before the end of the war in 1691 at least four of our reports
had been published (see references). In Holland and Germany the Histoire de la
revolution d’Irlande was probably better known than the English accounts, and the
Historischer Kern oder kurze Chronica for the year 1690, published at Hamburg
(Anon. 1691a), contains a report on the Battle of the Boyne as one of the seven
most important events of that year. Both the Histoire and the Kurze Chronica
contain engravings of the battle. Thus, in view of the rapid reception and interest
in these events, it seems likely that the document would have been copied not very
long after July 1690. As in the question of authorship, a final answer cannot,
however, be given.

Finally, a search was made through the extensive surviving manuscript papers
of Leibniz in order to find, if possible, related items. Of the volume of his writings
on military and related matters, such as ballistics, weaponry, strategic and logistic
studies, at least one item was located that would seem to have a bearing on the
‘complete account’. In this undated paper (LH 36, 184–5) Leibniz considered the
logistic problem of an army that has to cross a river in the face of an enemy; he
had seen the solutions proposed by an experienced general to an important prince,
neither of whom are named. The paper begins: ‘Il s’agit quelques fois de passer une grande rivière à la vue d’une armée ennemie, et j’ai vu les desseins et
modelles, qu’un General fort experimenté avoit presenté pour cet effect à un
grand Prince. . .’. The general had recommended choosing a location where there
would be a bend in the river and preferably with the convexity towards the enemy
which would force the enemy to divide his forces. Other favourable features would
be higher banks on the side of the advancing army or islands in the river. Leibniz
had a river such as the Danube in mind and he elaborated on a scheme with rafts
to transport the soldiers and artillery.

Though Leibniz makes no mention of the Irish war—this item may well have
been written long before—the relation of these considerations to the reports on
the Battle of the Boyne and the Irish war is obvious. On the point of the River
Boyne defended by James, the banks may have been a little higher on the
northern side—the ‘complete account’ says that the banks on both sides were
high—and there was a loop in the river; the convexity was, however, towards the
advancing army, but William succeeded just the same in getting James to divide his
forces. The defensive strategy of the Jacobites in 1690 and 1691 was to take
advantage of the geographical features of the country and to defend the passes
and rivers. And although they were easily routed at the River Boyne, it should be
remembered that they successfully defended the line of the Shannon for a year
after the decisive battle. The final conclusion of this paper is that although
Leibniz’s interest in the Irish war was primarily determined by the European
dimension and implications of the war, his studies in other fields such as logistics
and military science may also have contributed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to thank Dr Hans-Stephan Brather (Potsdam), Dr Detlef
Döring (Leipzig) and Rosemarie Caspar (Berlin) for reading and commenting on
an earlier version of this paper. The comments and suggestions of an unknown
referee are also gratefully acknowledged.
ABBREVIATIONS

A Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Berlin. Akademie Verlag, 1925–. The number of the series is given in roman numerals and the volume number in arabic numerals.

LBR Unpublished letter at the Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hanover.

LH Unpublished manuscript at the Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hanover.

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